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STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS AND 
LAW FOR STATISTICS 
D.H. Kaye* 
STATISTICS FOR LA WYERS. By Michael 0. Finkelstein and Bruce 
Levin. New York: Springer-Verlag. 1990. Pp. xxii, 608. Cloth $59; 
paper $39. 
Statistics is an emotionally charged subject. Many people fear it and 
hate it; some revel in it and worship it. Inside the discipline the 
Montagues engage in wordy debates with the Capulets, and sometimes 
even sue them in courts for holding wrong opinions. Most statisticians 
despise other statisticians, and all despise all nonstatisticians, who would 
like to be able to return the compliment, but are not quite sure how to 
shrug off a "best fit." In an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and con-
tempt, neither side is willing to learn what the other has to teach.1 
These observations, penned some twenty years ago, retain their 
truth today, and they apply with special force to one prominent subset 
of nonstatisticians - lawyers. Nevertheless, even within a profession 
as nonquantitatively inclined as law, exceptions exist. Michael Finkel-
stein is one. An accomplished lawyer and adjunct professor at Colum-
bia Law School, Finkelstein has spent at least a quarter century 
learning what statisticians have to teach and applying this knowledge 
in litigation and legal education. 2 He knows quite well how to shrug 
off, or put on, a best fit. In Statistics for Lawyers, Finkelstein teams up 
with Bruce Levin, a biostatistician at Columbia University's School of 
Public Health, to produce a unique textbook on statistics - a mixture 
• Regents Professor, Arizona State University College of Law. S.B. 1968, MIT; A.M. 1969, 
Harvard; J.D. 1972, Yale. - Ed. I am grateful to William Fairley and Hans Zeisel for com-
ments on a draft of this paper and to Tony D' Amato for correspondence and copies of portions 
of the transcript and the appellant's brief in Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1988). 
Portions of this review were completed while the author was a Visiting Research Fellow of the 
University of Chicago School of Law. 
1. J. LUCAS, THE CoNCEPT OF PROBABILITY 163 (1970). 
2. See M. F'INKELSI'EIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW: STUDIES IN THE APPLICA-
TION OF MATHEMATICAL PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS TO LEGAL PROBLEMS (1978); Finkel-
stein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L. 
REv. 338 (1966); Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of Multiple Regression Studies in Race and 
Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 737 (1980); Finkelstein, Multiple Regression Mod-
els in Employment Discrimination Cases - The Problem of Imperfect Proxies, 31 JURIMETRlCS J. 
109 (1990); Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. 
REv. 489 (1970); Finkelstein & Levenbach, Regression Estimates of Damages in Price-Fixing 
Cases, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRODS., Autumn 1983, at 145; Finkelstein & Robbins, A Probabilistic 
Approach to Tracing Presumptions in the Law of Restitution, 24 JURIMETRICS J. 65 (1983). 
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of legal vignettes, doctrine, statistical concepts, and exercises in apply-
ing these concepts. 
In this review, I describe and assess this unusual enchiridion. Part 
I summarizes the book's objectives and accomplishments. I conclude 
that any prospective or practicing attorney who works through Statis-
tics for Lawyers will indeed emerge with "a fuller appreciation of the 
standards for analyzing data and making inferences" (p. ix). Part II 
applies some of these standards to the use of probability theory in Bra-
nion v. Gramly. 3 I criticize the mathematical argument advanced in 
that case and suggest that its defects would have been apparent to law-
yers with the "fuller appreciation" that Statistics for Lawyers seeks to 
convey. 
I. STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 
Cases of false advertising,4 theft,5 mass murder,6 discrimination by 
race, age, and gender,7 voting rights,8 antitrust,9 taxation,10 domestic 
relations,11 environmental torts,12 and product liability13 dance across 
3. 855 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1988). 
4. Pp. 34-37 (drug efficacy claims); see also Barnes, The Significance of Quantitative Evidence 
in Federal Trade Commission Deceptive Advertising Cases, LAW & CoNTEMP. PR.OBS., Autumn 
1983, at 25. 
5. Pp. 37-41 (estimating losses from defalcation); pp. 84-90 (robbery). 
6. P. 90; see also Fienberg & Kaye, Legal and Statistical Aspects of Some Mysterious Clusters, 
154 J. ROYAL STATISTICAL SOCY. 61 (1991). 
7. Pp. 1-6, 311-12 (employment tests); pp. 59-61, 383-86 (public school finance); pp. 114-17, 
207-11 (jury selection); pp. 122-23 (hiring of public school teachers); pp. 126-27 (appointments 
to city board); pp. 354-56 (promotions of employees); pp. 368-74 (salaries); pp. 404-07 (salaries, 
hiring and promotions); pp. 408-18 (salaries and promotions); pp. 189-91, 452-67 (capital 
sentences); see also STATISTICAL MF:rnons IN DISCRIMINATION LmGATION (D. Kaye & M. 
Aickin eds. 1986). 
8. Pp. 47-49 (reapportionment); pp. 66-70 (weighted voting); see also Moncrief & Joula, 
When the Courts Don't Compute: Mathematics and Floterial Districts in Legislative Reapportion-
ment Cases, 4 J.L. & POL. 737 (1988). 
9. Pp. 70-72 (market concentration guidelines); pp. 386-88 (estimating damages from price-
fixing); see also Rubinfeld & Steiner, Quantitative Methods in Antitrust Litigation, LAW & CoN-
TEMP. PR.OBS., Autumn 1983, at 69. 
10. Pp. 31-34 (railroad property assessments); pp. 288-89 (valuations of charitable remain-
ders); pp. 290-91 (lifetime of depreciable contracts); see also Bright, Kadane & Nagin, Statistical 
Sampling in Tax Audits, 13 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 305 (1988); Brown, Statistical Sampling in the 
IRS Examination of Large Cases, TAX EXEC., Apr. 1982, at 175. 
11. Pp. 96-101; see also BIOMATHEMATICAL EVIDENCE OF PATERNITY (K. Hummel & J. 
Gerchow eds. 1982); INCLUSION PROBABILmES IN PARENTAGE TEsTING (R. Walker ed. 1983); 
Berry, Inferences Using DNA Profiling in Forensic Identification and Paternity Cases, STATISTI-
CAL SCI. (forthcoming 1991); Evett & Werrett, Paternity Calculations from DNA Multilocus 
Profiles, 29 J. FORENSIC SCI. SocY. 249 (1989); Kaye, DNA Paternity Probabilities, 24 FAM. L.Q. 
279 (1990); Kaye, Presumptions, Probability and Paternity, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 323 (1990); Kaye, 
The Probability of an Ultimate Issue: The Strange Cases of Paternity Testing, 15 IOWA L. R.Ev. 
75 (1989). 
12. Pp. 13-22 (leukemia from atomic tests); pp. 66, 297-300 (leukemia from drinking water). 
13. Pp. 8-12 (Dalkon shield); pp. 191-93, 255-57 (Bendectin). 
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the pages of Statistics for Lawyers. Many, like McCleskey v. Kemp 14 
- the powerful but unsuccessful challenge to death sentencing in 
Georgia - and People v. Collins 15 - the misuse of statistics to convict 
an interracial couple with a yellow car in Los Angeles - already are 
well-known to many lawyers.16 Others, like Anderson v. Cryovac, 
Inc. 11 - the out-of-court settlement of the toxic tort claim for con-
tamination of drinking water in Woburn, Massachusetts - have been 
discussed primarily in the statistical literature.18 Still others, such as 
the survey used to determine the sales tax owecJ by a Colorado mail 
order firm, 19 have not been reported elsewhere. 
As is appropriate to an introductory textbook, the treatment of 
these cases and issues is panoramic rather than microscopic, and the 
material is organized around statistical concepts and methods rather 
than legal subject areas. Nearly every statistical procedure that has 
proved useful in litigation is described, at least briefly, including many 
that are not considered in most elementary statistics texts. In addition 
to the basics of probability theory (pp. 76-110), random sampling (pp. 
258-83), descriptive statistics (pp. 1-61), regression (pp. 323-467), and 
contingency tables (pp. 156-257), Statistics for Lawyers describes sur-
vival analysis (pp. 284-308), nonparametric methods (pp. 309-22), and 
jackknife and bootstrap techniques (pp. 461-67). It discusses the hy-
pergeometric distribution (pp. 133-38), which has confused some 
courts,20 procedures for combining results from related contingency 
tables (pp. 235-53), which have been overlooked by some courts,21 lo-
gistic regression (pp. 447-61), which figured prominently in the proof 
of racial discrimination in McCleskey v. Kemp, 22 and many biostatisti-
cal and epidemiologic concepts, which have become decisively impor-
tant in ascertaining causation in much litigation and environmental 
regulation. 23 
14. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). Pp. 460. 
15. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968). Pp. 84-88. 
16. For newly discovered information about the origin of the probability argument in Collins, 
as well as a fresh treatment of the evidence to which that argument was directed, see Edwards, 
Influence, Diagrams, Bayesian Imperialism and the Collins Case: An Appeal to Reason, CAR-
DOZO L. REv. (forthcoming 1991). 
17. 96 F.R.D. 431 (D. Mass. 1982); pp. 66, 297-300; see Butterfield, Settlement Averts Key 
Trial in Deaths Tied to Pollution, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1986, at Al6, col. 1. 
18. Fienberg & Kaye, supra note 6; Lagakos, Wesson & Zelen, An Analysis of Contaminated 
Well Water and Health Effects in Woburn, Massachusetts, 81 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 583 (1986). 
19. Pp. 269-70 (using the case to illustrate nonresponse bias in sampling). 
20. Kaye, Hypergeometric Confusion in the Fourth Circuit, 26 JURIMBTRICS J. 215 (1986). 
21. Kaye, Statistical Evidence of Discrimination in Jury Selection, in STATISTlCAL METHODS 
IN DISCRIMINATION LmGATION, supra note 7, at 13. 
22. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
23. Compare Lynch v. Merrill-National Laboratories, 830 F.2d 1190, 1194, 1196 (1st Cir. 
1987) (expert's conclusion that the drug Bendectin is teratogenic was "foundationless" without 
"confirmatory epidemiologic data") with DeLuca v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 911 F.2d 941 
(3d Cir. 1990) (same expert's opinion was improperly excluded when he presented the same 
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The statistical expositions that bracket the legal applications shy 
away from derivations or proofs, and the exercises emphasize concep-
tualization over computation. Nevertheless, many of the problems are 
not easily solved, and occasional summation or integral signs in the 
text may frighten the mathematically faint of heart.24 This would be 
unfortunate, because the notation and prose are precise, the underly-
ing ideas and their historical foundations are revealed, and the au-
thors' comments are insightful and sophisticated. 25 
In this respect, the book is an overdue addition to a typically unin-
spired and oversimplified literature26 in which lawyers (or other non-
statisticians trained in economics, social science, or business) try to 
explain statistics to other lawyers, all too often misstating basic con-
cepts. 27 In contrast, Statistics for Lawyers is dependably knowledgea-
ble and careful in explaining statistical reasoning and terminology. 28 
Consider, for example, the book's treatment of screening and diag-
nostic tests as it applies to a 1987 bill on drug testing in the workplace 
introduced in the New York Senate. This bill provided that any 
epidemiologic findings in the form of confidence intervals). See generally THE EVOLVING ROLE 
OF STATISTICAL AssESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE CoURTS (S. Fienberg ed. 1988) [hereinafter 
STATISilCAL AssESSMENTS]. 
Statistics for Lawyers also discusses meta-analysis, a semiformal technique for combining data 
from separate studies (pp. 254-57). This procedure, which can be expected to play a controver-
sial role in toxic tort cases, made its forensic debut in In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 916 
F.2d 829, 841, 856-58 (3d Cir. 1990). 
Of course, not every topic that one might wish to see is included. The ingenious displays of 
modern exploratory data analysis are not mentioned, and the application of Bayesian inference to 
problems with continuous variables is slighted. 
24. Some paragraphs may elude readers who somehow managed to acquire a college educa-
tion without calculus. For example, Finkelstein and Levin write that 
The cumulative hazard function H(t) at time tis the integral of the hazard function 0 from 
0 to t. In continuous time, the hazard function is equal to minus the natural logarithm of 
the survival function; taking antilogs, the survival function is equal to e raised to the power 
of minus the cumulative hazard function. In symbols, H(t) = f 0(u)du = -logS(t), and 
S(t) = exp[-H(tJ]. Thus, one way to estimate H(t) is by summing the discrete hazard 
estimates d/n1 up to time t. ... 
P. 286. 
25. A variety of statistical issues have puzzled courts. By way of text or problems (happily, 
with answers collected in an appendix), Finkelstein and Levin address most of them. E.g., pp. 
125-26 (arguing that one-tailed tests are more appropriate in most litigation than the more com-
monly used two-tailed ones); pp. 170-71, 492-93 (criticizing the court's statistical reasoning in 
EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1983), revd. on other 
grounds, Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867 (1984)); pp. 212-14, 503-04 
(criticizing Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex v. Greenholtz, 567 F.2d 
1368 (8th Cir. 1977)); pp. 233-35, 509-10 (criticizing Moultrie v. Martin, 690 F.2d 1078 (4th Cir. 
1982)). 
26. See, e.g., Fienberg, Book Review, 8 J.L. & COMMERCE 317, 321 (1988); Peterson, Book 
Review, 26 JURIMETRICS 329 (1986). 
27. Concepts like P-values and confidence coefficients, for example, are not always defined 
correctly. Kaye, Book Review, 84 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 1094 (1989). The descriptions of 
these terms in Statistics for Lawyers are found at p. 124 and pp. 171-81. 
28. Another textbook on legal statistics that has this quality is J. GASTWIRTH, STATISilCAL 
REASONING IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY (1988), reviewed by Kaye, supra note 27. 
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screening test "must have a degree of accuracy of at least ninety-five 
percent" and that "positive test results must then be confirmed by an 
independent test, using a fundamentally different method and having a 
degree of accuracy of 98%" (p. 105). This proposed legislation may 
seem straightforward, but it is not. In general, it takes more than one 
number to characterize the accuracy of a test: "The sensitivity of a test 
is the proportion of all affected individuals who (correctly) test posi-
tive (P[ +IA]). The specificity of a test is the proportion of all unaf-
fected individuals who (correctly) test negative (P[-jU])" (p. 101). 
There is no necessary connection between these quantities. A test can 
be exquisitely sensitive (it correctly identifies virtually all the drug 
users who submit to testing) but not very specific (many nonusers are 
included among those who test positive); or it can be highly specific 
but not at all sensitive; or, it can be both extremely sensitive and 
specific. 
The New York bill would have been clearer had it defined the re-
quired degree of "accuracy" in terms of sensitivity and specificity. 
Furthermore, the perceptive reader of Statistics for Lawyers will recog-
nize another wrinkle in this seemingly simple bill. As Finkelstein and 
Levin ask, "Assuming that 0.1% of the adult working population 
takes drugs, and that 'accuracy' refers to both sensitivity and specific-
ity, what is the positive predictive value of a test program meeting the 
bill's requirements" (pp. 105-06)? The answer can be found from the 
formula "PPV = P[Aj+] = P[ +,A]/P[ +],"for the "positive predic-
tive value," which is defined as "the proportion of all test-positive-
people who are truly affected" (p. 102). Like Finkelstein and Levin, I 
leave the detailed calculation to the reader, who may be surprised to 
find that only about one in every fifty-four positives on the screening 
test with the "95% accuracy," and about one in two positives on both 
that test and the independent confirmatory test with the "98% accu-
racy," will be users.29 
In raising and analyzing such issues, Statistics for Lawyers succeeds 
admirably in its goal of introducing the ideas and techniques of statis-
tics that have the most application to the courtroom and to the formu-
lation of legal doctrine. Despite its pedestrian title, it is not a routine 
statistics text with legal examples tossed in. The selection of topics 
and examples, as well as the exposition of statistics and law, is erudite, 
informed, and even entertaining. With a strong and steady hand, Sta-
tistics for Lawyers opens the tool chest of the professional statistician, 
permitting students of the law to peer within. 
29. The small number of true positives results from the low prevalence of drug use in the 
tested population. This effect of a low base rate is important in many other contexts. See, e.g., 
W. CURRAN, M. HALL & D. KAYE, HEALTH CARE LAW, FORENSIC SCIENCE AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 163·67 (4th ed. 1990). 
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II. LAW FOR STATISTICS 
Given its purpose and orientation, Statistics for Lawyers is less in-
terested - and less effective - in examining legal doctrine and prac-
tice. 30 Just as the focus on legal applications makes Statistics for 
Lawyers a most unusual statistics text, so too, its bare bones approach 
to legal doctrine and cases takes it outside the mainstream of law 
books. Statistics for Lawyers is neither casebook nor hombook. 31 The 
courts and lawyers confronting statistical studies are visible only as 
skiagrams. The notes on legal doctrine, while accurate, are the soul of 
brevity, and the citations to the relevant cases and literature are not 
uniformly complete and current. 32 
This limitation33 is especially apparent when one considers specific 
topics in greater depth. I shall choose but one - the application of 
mathematics in a criminal case to express the probability of a disputed 
event indicative of guilt or innocence. Furthermore, of the many cases 
inv?lving such "probability evidence, "34 I shall analyze only one -
30. Statistics for Lawyers does not purport to investigate the problems arising from the injec-
tion of statistics and statistical experts into the legal process. A few recent books do focus on the 
practical problems of forensic statistics. The most significant is Statistical Assessments supra note 
23, a National Research Council committee report containing thoughtful recommendations for 
improving the practice of attorneys and statisticians. Essays and case studies by statisticians 
involved in legal proceedings are collected in STATISTICS AND THE LAW (M. Degroot, s. 
Fienberg & J. Kadane eds. 1986). For reflections on these works and on the emerging specialty 
of "legal statistics," see Kaye, Improving Legal Statistics, 24 LAW & Socv. REV. 1255 (1991); 
Kaye, Statistical Proo/in the Courts, 35 CoNTEMP. PSYCH. 839 (1990). 
31. Cf BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF: FUNDAMENTALS OF QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE 
(1983) (casebook). Finkelstein and Levin explain that "[j]udicial opinions are not given because 
they generally do not elucidate the statistical issues that are our primary concern." P. vii. 
32. Statistics for Lawyers has a section on probabilities relating to "hair evidence" (pp. 88-
91). A number of the cases cited there as apparently involving the probability of matching hair 
fibers involve no such evidence. E.g., State v. Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. 1987); People v. 
Risley, 214 N.Y. 75, 108 N.E. 200 (1915). They are, however, related to the broader question of 
the admissibility of "population frequency statistics." Moreover, the references to the contro-
versy in the forensic scientific literature omit not only the study, Wickenheiser & Hepworth, 
Further Evaluation of Probabilities in Human Scalp Hair Comparisons, 35 J. FORENSIC Ser. 1323 
(1990), which appeared after the publication of Statistics for Lawyers, but also Aitken & Robert-
son, A Contribution to the Discussion of Probabilities and Human Hair Comparisons, 32 J. FO-
RENSIC Ser. 684 (1987), Miller, Procedural Bias in Forensic Science Examinations of Human 
Hair, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 157 (1987), as well as all law review articles on the subject. 
Finkelstein and Levin also list most of the unique Minnesota cases rejecting well-founded 
probabilities (pp. 90-91), but fail to note that Minn. Stat.§ 634.25 (Supp. 1989) repudiates these 
cases as applied to "statistical population frequency evidence" involving genetic markers. For 
other examples of significant literature not included in Statistics for Lawyers, see supra notes 4-
11. 
33. I use the term "limitation" descriptively rather than pejoratively. Finkelstein and Levin 
cannot be faulted for choosing to write a statistics text instead of a study of the law. Likewise, 
my citations to items published in 1990 are intended to supplement the references in Statistics for 
Lawyers rather than to criticize the authors for not mentioning material that was not available to 
them. 
34. For examples, see McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 210 (J. Strong 4th ed. forthcoming 
1991); Kaye, The Admissibility of "Probability Evidence" in Criminal Trials (pts. I & 2), 26 
JURIMETRICS J. 343 (1986), 27 JURIMETRICS J. 160 (1987). 
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Branion v. Gramly. 35 Statistics for Lawyers makes no serious effort to 
describe the case or to investigate the general question of the admissi-
bility of probability evidence, 36 but I shall show how it provides the 
basic tools for a more probing study. 
As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit describes Branion, 
Donna Branion ... was strangled and shot at least four times. She was 
not molested; there were no signs of forced entry into the apartment, 
from which nothing was stolen. This led the police to doubt that a stran-
ger was responsible. A jury concluded that Donna's husband, John M. 
Branion, Jr., did the deed. The evidence was circumstantial, but what 
circumstances!37 
What circumstances, indeed. John and Donna Branion came from 
prominent Chicago families. John's father was a well-known attorney 
and the city's deputy chief public defender.38 Donna's father was a 
wealthy bank.er.39 John himself held "a position of responsibility"40 as 
a physician at a hospital in Hyde Park, and had marched with Martin 
Luther King, Jr.41 The state judge who presided over the trial may 
have tried to collect money from John's many friends in exchange for 
a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict. 42 
When appeals in the Illinois courts proved unavailing and the con-
viction became final, John fled, making his way to Uganda. There he 
allegedly became Idi Amin's physician until that dictator was over-
thrown in 1979.43 The Ugandan government returned Branion to the 
United States in 1983, and he began serving his sentence of imprison-
ment. Three years later, he filed a motion for a writ of habeas corpus, 
asserting his innocence and maintaining that no rational jury hearing 
the state's evidence could have found him guilty. Two federal district 
judges ruled to the contrary, and Branion's appeals from these deci-
sions came to the Seventh Circuit. 
Branion's ~ttorneys - three law professors at Northwestern Uni-
3S. 8SS F.2d 12S6 (7th Cir. 1988). 
36. It cites Branion, but only for the very general proposition that "statistical methods, prop-
erly employed, have substantial value ...• Nothing about the nature of litigation in general, or 
the criminal process in particular, makes anathema of additional information, whether or not 
that knowledge has numbers attached" (p. 94). 
37. 8SS F.2d at 12S6. 
38. 8SS F.2d at 12S8. Raised by a white family, John Marshall Branion became Chicago's 
first black public defender. D'Amato, The Ultimate Injustice: When a Court Deconstructs the 
Facts, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 1313, 1317 (1990). 
39. 8SS F.2d at 1258. D'Amato, supra note 38, at 1317, remarks that the family was "one of 
the wealthiest black families in the nation." 
40. 85S F.2d at 1258. 
41. D'Amato, supra note 38, at 1317-18, describes more ofBranion's involvement in the civil 
rights movement, and Heise, John Branion, recently freed in wife's slaying, Chicago Tribune, 
Sept. 14, 1990, § 2, at 8, col. S, reports that Branion was King's personal physician. 
42. SSS F.2d at 12S8-S9. The judge was convicted of extortion in connection with other 
cases. 8SS F.2d at 12S8-S9. 
43. 8SS F.2d at 12S9 (citing New York Times and Associated Press accounts). 
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versity44 - submitted a brief relying on a "standard deviation curve" 
to show that "the chance that Dr. Branion is guilty . . . is one in 
9,000."45 The response was blistering.46 Judge Easterbrook's opinion 
for a unanimous panel ranges across sources as diverse as "Werner 
Heisenberg's work"47 and Isaac Todhunter's 1865 History of the 
Mathematical Theory of Probability. 48 It may be the world's first ap-
pellate court opinion to take the partial derivatives of a function.4 9 
And it is scathing in its criticism of counsel's use of probability theory. 
The bemused reader of this judicial tour de force may wonder who is 
right: the attorney-academicians, the academician turned judge,50 or 
neither? To answer this question, we must begin with counsels' 
computations. 
A. Constructing a Probability Model 
John Branion's petition for a writ of habeas corpus relied on the 
defense of factual impossibility. He argued that he could not have 
murdered his wife within the relevant time-period, for even under the 
state's theory of the crime, that would have required him to drive from 
the hospital (where he was working until 11:30) to his home (making 
two stops en route),51 to strangle and shoot his wife, to clean his 
hands, to dispose of his gun, and to summon his neighbors - all by 
11:57 (when the police logged a call reporting the death). To show 
that he could not complete all these tasks in these twenty-seven min-
utes, Branion invoked some elementary principles of probability and 
44. Professor Anthony D'Amato represented Branion at oral argument. 855 F.2d at 1257. 
With him on the brief were Professors Thomas F. Geraghty and Jon R. Waltz and two students 
working in the Northwestern University Legal Clinic. 
45. 855 F.2d at 1270. Professor D'Amato has advised me that he alone bears responsibility 
for the probability argument. Letter from Anthony D'Amato to David Kaye (Nov. 10, 1989) 
[hereinafter D' Amato letter]. 
46. The court's displeasure extended beyond the probability argument. See 855 F.2d at 
1260-61. 
47. 855 F.2d at 1263 n.5. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, to which the court alludes, 
states that certain pairs of physical variables, like the position and momentum of a particle, 
cannot be measured simultaneously with arbitrary precision. It is all too easy to misinterpret this 
fundamental feature of the subatomic world as stating that an observer always interferes with the 
system being observed. See, e.g., Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers 
Can Learn from Modem Physics, 103 HARV. L. REv. l, 17-20 (1989); Tribe, Law's Geometry and 
the Curvature of Constitutional Space, 44 REc. A. B. CITY N.Y. 575, 576 (1989). The uncer-
tainty principle supports no such implication, and this feature of the microscopic realm of quan-
tum mechanics has no real application to the macroscopic events that constitute the litigator's 
world. In short, the uncertainty with which judges and jurors must deal is unrelated to 
"Heisenberg's work." 
48. 855 F.2d at 1264. 
49. 855 F.2d at 1265-66 & n.7. 
SO. Frank Easterbrook, a specialist in antitrust law and economics, came to the bench from 
the University of Chicago faculty. 
51. Branion picked his son up from nursery school and made another stop to talk with a 
friend with whom he was to have had lunch. 855 F.2d at 1262. 
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statistics. 52 Branion's brief to the Seventh Circuit argued that if the 
impossibly short time of six minutes were allowed for all the events 
other than pure driving and strangling, he still would have had to 
drive from the hospital and complete the strangling in twenty-one 
minutes - a feat that could not be reconciled with the evidence: 
[T]here were two key pieces of uncontradicted prosecutorial evidence 
given in the form of a range of estimated times: Dr. Belmonte's evidence 
that the bruises on Donna Branion's neck took between 15 and 30 min-
utes to form, and Detective Boyle's evidence that the driving time of Dr. 
Branion's route took between 6 to 12 minutes. When evidentiary ranges 
are given, the most probable events can be plotted on a standard devia-
tion curve or ''bell curve": 
Frequency 
3cr 2cr lcr 1cr 2cr 3cr Values 
95.45% 
99.73% 
6 min ................ DRIVING TIME .............•..... 12 min. 
15 min ................ GARROTING TIME ............... 30 min. 
Figure 1 
... At (a) 15 minutes and (b) 6 minutes, the probabilities are less than 
1 %. Moreover, since the two time-sequences are independent of each 
other, the probabilities must be multiplied to find the chances that both 
were applicable to Dr. Branion. Hence the probability that the time be-
tween garroting and shooting was 15 minutes and the probability that 
the driving time was 6 minutes is .01 X .01 = .0001. ... A reasonable 
doubt probability of90%, or 0.9, is 9,000 times larger in magnitude than 
the joint probability of .0001. In other words, if there were 9,000 cases 
similar to Dr. Branion's where the only two facts known were the garrot-
ing time and the driving time, then 8,999 defendants would be innocent 
and only one guilty. In short, the chance that Dr. Branion is guilty, on 
52. Branion also adduced more traditional arguments about the timing of the murder. For 
example, he emphasized that a neighbor had heard "three sounds and the sounds of some com-
motion" from Branion's house before Branion had even left the hospital. Brief for Petitioner-
Appellant at 18. 
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the basis of the garroting time and the driving time alone, is one in 
9,()()().53 
As previously indicated, the 1/9000 figure for the probability of 
Branion's guilt did not impress the court, at least not favorably. First, 
noticing that the "jury could have found that 30 minutes lapsed be-
tween Branion's leaving the Hospital and his call to the police," the 
court concluded that "[w]e therefore should like to know the 
probability that the combination of travel and murder times came to 
30 minutes or less" rather than the twenty-one minutes or less dis-
cussed in Branion's brief. 54 
This criticism suggests that Branion set out to solve the wrong 
problem, but it does not challenge the method he used to attach a 
probability to the combined time being less than some critical figure. 
The appropriate number may be twenty-one minutes, thirty minutes, 
or some other value, but this issue need not detain us. In the face of 
unavoidable uncertainty in the times for miscellaneous acts other than 
driving and garroting, the best procedure would be to compute the 
pertinent probabilities for all the plausible numbers in the twenty-one 
to thirty minute range. 
The more fundamental question is the manner in which the 
probability for any of these times should be computed, and the opinion 
attacks the methodology of the Branion brief on several grounds. To 
analyze these statistical issues clearly, it is essential to specify the 
probabilistic model that underlies Branion's computation - an under-
taking left unfinished by both Branion and the court, but one that Sta-
tistics for Lawyers can help complete. 55 We want to know how long it 
would take Branion to drive to his house and to strangle a person of a 
certain bone structure, leaving a bruise of a given depth without break-
ing any bones.56 To measure this quantity, we could conduct the fol-
lowing experiment: have people of Branion's skill at driving and 
strangling drive the route and strangle similar victims to the same de-
gree of bruising. This hypothetical experiment would generate a dis-
tribution, that is, a list a relative frequencies for each value of the total 
elapsed time Z. If nothing changed from one instance to another, Z 
would be constant. We could express this idealized situation with a 
monumentally simple equation: 
Z = CONSTANT. (1) 
This equation merely states that the same time would be recorded for 
each trial. The relative frequency of the times, f(Z}, would have the 
53. 855 F.2d 1256 app. at 1270 (emphasis in original). 
54. 855 F.2d at 1265. 
55. For the book's expositions of probability distributions, see pp. 23-61, 111-55. 
56. "Donna Branion was strangled as well as shot. Her neck was bruised; she had been 
garrotted with the cord from her iron. The pressure was not great enough to break any bones." 
855 F.2d at 1262. 
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value one whenever Z is the observed constant, and the value zero for 
all other values of Z 
Of course, our horrid experiment would not have this trivial an 
outcome. Things can and will change from one instance to another.57 
On days when there is little traffic, when the driver is lucky enough to 
meet only green stoplights, when the victim can be garroted with a 
minimum of fuss, and when a bruise will form quickly, Z will be small. 
When traffic and road conditions are less favorable and the victim less 
conducive to prompt garroting and bruising, Z will be large. Many 
small, effectively random factors would influence the magnitude of Z, 
and we could represent the combined effect of these variables with a 
revised equation: 
Z = CONSTANT + 8. (2) 
According to this model, the measured times Z are just the sum of the 
previous constant term and an "error" or "disturbance" term 8, re-
flecting the impact of the many things that cause Z to vary from one 
test to the next. Sometimes the net effect is to lengthen Z, sometimes 
to shorten it. The average of these disturbances, however, may be 
taken to be zero, 58 so that the mean value of Z is just the constant 
term. With these assumptions, the distribution/{Z) is no longer a soli-
tary, sharp spike; it covers a broader band of values centered at 
CONSTANT. 
If we really knew the constant and the error function, we would 
have no problem finding the probability that the time would be less 
than any given amount z9 The probability is the area under the distri-
bution /{Z) to the left of z9 as sketched in Figure 2, which arbitrarily 
(at this point) displays a normal distribution. 
Obviously, we cannot perform this experiment, and Branion cer-
tainly did not examine the distribution f{Z) to deduce the 1/9000 
probability that he paraded before the court. Instead, he (1) consid-
ered two different distributions, (2) made some strong assumptions 
about them, (3) looked at the area in each of their tails, and (4) multi-
plied these areas together. This first step is fine, at least in principle. 
The second is more defensible than the court acknowledged. The 
third and fourth are blunders. 
57. Ideally, we would want to ensure the relevant conditions during the experiment matched 
those on the day in question. But perfect control is impossible and some influences may be 
overlooked. The result even with a suitably controlled experiment is variability in the measured 
times. 
58. The error term can be defined to have a mean of zero without affecting the generality of 
the model. Suppose that an error term (call it e) had a nonzero mean m. Then by defining 8 to 
be e - m, we obtain a transformed error term with mean zero. The equation now reads 
Z = (CONSTANT+m) + 8 
which has the desired form, a constant term (equal to the old constant term plus m) plus an error 
term with mean zero. 




One possible distribution of times reflecting "smearing" due to random 
variables, and the probability of an observed time being less than some 
number z, 
Because the total time Z cannot be measured directly, it is reason-
able to focus on some components that can be. In other words, one 
can consider Z = X + Y, where X is the driving time and Y the 
bruising time, try to ascertain their distributions g(X) and h(Y) sepa-
rately, and then combine them to find f(Z). At the outset, it is easy 
enough to write down general equations that might describe X and Y. 
A model such as equation (2) seems appropriate. That is, we assume 
that 
X = CONSTANTx + Bx (3) 
and that 
Y = CONSTANTr +Br (4) 
where CONSTANTx and CONSTANTy are constants, and Bx and By 
are error terms. 
Because the error terms can be defined so that they average out to 
zero, 59 the constants can be estimated by the means of the observed 
times. The police drove the route six times in 1968, with results rang-
ing from six to twelve minutes. 60 The mean time for the sample is the 
arithmetic average of these six measurements. Despite the fact that 
virtually any statistician would use the sample mean to estimate the 
constant term, Branion did not report this number. Instead, he aver-
aged only the two extreme measurements. 61 Still, this number could 
be close to the unreported sample mean. 62 
Likewise, Branion averaged the end points of the pathologist's esti-
59. See supra note 58. 
60. 855 F.2d at 1265. 
61. 855 F.2d at 1265. 
62. Trial counsel never asked the police officers for any of the driving times other than the 
two extremes. Trial transcript at 270-93. 
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mate of fifteen to thirty minutes for the time needed for a bruise to 
form.63 Nevertheless, the court's rhetoric that "we have no idea what 
the mean ... might be" seems overdrawn. If we credit the testimony, 
then we know that the mean is more than fifteen minutes and less than 
thirty, and if we presume that people giving a range of possibilities 
usually have in mind a central point plus or minus some quantity, then 
we do have an idea that the mean is near the midpoint of the fifteen to 
thirty minute interval, as Branion posited. 
Despite the doubts about Branion's numbers, let us proceed as if 
they are good estimates of the constants in (3) and (4). We still need 
to specify the error terms, for they capture the randomness in the 
times X and Y. Branion assumed, in effect, that the error terms were 
normally distributed64 with standard deviations one and 2.5 minutes, 
respectively. 65 
The court dismissed these assumptions out of hand. Of the postu-
lated distribution of driving times, it said, "Nothing suggests a Gaus-
sian distribution."66 Of the postulated distribution of bruising times, it 
remarked, "[W]e have no idea what the mean time or standard devia-
tion might be."67 The court did not explicitly denounce the assump-
tion of normality for the bruising time, but it probably meant to. 
Yet, the suggestion of normality is not so outlandish. To be sure, 
the testimony itself, involving the range for only six driving times and 
an expert's guess as to the range of bruising times, is dreadfully lim-
ited. But to observe that this evidence alone does not suggest a normal 
distribution is not to demonstrate that the assumption is unreasonable. 
Many physical and biological processes give rise to normal distribu-
tions. A remarkable theorem in statistics helps explain the prevalence 
of these distributions. This Central Limit Theorem, as it is called, as-
serts that the sum of a large number of random variables has an ap-
proximately normal distribution even when the underlying variables 
are not normal. 68 Now the disturbance terms in equations (3) and ( 4) 
represent the combined effect of many essentially random factors, such 
63. The testimony of the pathologist in this regard is slightly ambiguous. See Trial transcript 
at 470-72. 
64. A normal distribution is a relative frequency curve (more precisely, a probability density 
function) with some highly specific characteristics. It is one of a family of curves that are, as 
Branion's brief put it, "bell-shaped." 855 F.2d 1256 app. at 1270; see pp. 25, 117-18. 
65. The standard deviations measure the extent of the variations in the times that would be 
obtained in repeated experiments. See p. 42. 
66. Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1265 (7th Cir. 1988). Normal distributions are often 
called Gaussian, especially in the physical sciences, in honor of Karl Frederich Gauss' work on 
error distributions (p. 119); see also 1 THE PROBABILISTIC REVOLUTION 272 (L. Kruger, L.J. 
Datson & M. Heidelberger eds. 1987). 
67. 855 F.2d at 1265. The court disparaged the pathologist's statement of the range of times 
as "a number from the air." 855 F.2d at 1265. 
68. See pp. 118-20; D. MooRE & G. McCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OP STA-
TISTICS 416 (1989). 
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as, for (3), the timing of stoplights, how many cars are at each inter-
section, and so on. The resulting delays are effectively random vari-
ables, and the theorem therefore implies that the scatter of observed 
times about the constant terms could well be approximately normal. 
Although the court is correct to say that this normal model cannot be 
derived or verified from the limited data, one could still maintain that 
the data are not inconsistent with this theoretical picture. 
Suppose, then, that we indulge the assumption of normality. We 
accept equations (3) and (4) with the added conditions that each error 
term is normally distributed. Two parameters, the mean and the stan-
dard deviation, are sufficient to specify a normal distribution. The 
mean gives the location of the center of the distribution, and the stan-
dard deviation indicates the width of the curve, as shown in Branion's 
brief. 69 Because the constant terms express the regularity in the times, 
the error terms must have means of zero. 70 
Branion's estimates for the standard deviations are difficult to de-
fend. Ordinarily, one would estimate the standard deviation of the 
error term with a sample standard deviation. 71 The latter quantity is 
easily computed. 72 Instead of calculating the sample standard devia-
tion, however, Branion blithely took one minute as the standard devia-
tion. Even without knowing the four intermediate driving times in the 
six to twelve minute interval, the usual estimator of the standard 
deviation must have a larger value. A little arithmetic reveals that it 
can be no less than 1.9 minutes.73 Although the court did not point 
out that Branion's estimate for the standard deviation was mathemati-
cally impossible, it did sense an incongruity between the data and Bra-
nion's wildly optimistic figure. 74 
69. See supra text accompanying note 53. 
70. See supra note 58. 
71. When the sample standard deviation is used, it may be better to use a Student's curve 
rather than a normal curve to compute the tail-end probability. See, e.g., pp. 224-25; D. FREED-
MAN, R. PISANI & R. PURVES, STATISTICS 463 (1980). This would increase the probability by 
an amount that depends on the size of the sample used in estimating the standard deviation. 
72. For the six measurements of the driving time, which we may designate X1, X2, ••• , X6, 
the sample standard deviation is [(X1-M)2 + (X2-M)2 + ... + (X6-M)2]/5, where Mis the 
sample mean. One might ask why the sum of the squared deviations from the mean is divided by 
five instead of six. After all, there were six observations. It turns Ol!t that dividing by the 
number of sample observations produces a biased estimator, and dividing by the number of ob-
servations less one corrects this problem. 
73. The smaller the standard deviation, the closer the measurements tend to cluster around 
the mean. Knowing the most extreme values X1 = 6 and X2 = 12, we can deduce the range of 
possible sample standard deviations. The smallest standard deviation occurs when the unre-
ported measurements each equal the sample mean, for in that situation these observations con-
tribute nothing to the sum of the squares. Thus, min[S2] = [(6-9)2 + (12-9)2]/5 = 3.6, and 
min[S] = v'3.6 = 1.9. The largest sample standard deviation occurs when the unreported val-
ues are as far from the sample mean as possible - when they are at the extremes. Thus, max[S2] 
= [3(6-9)2 + 3(12-9)2]/5 = 3min[S2] = 10.8, and max[S] = v'l0.8 = 3.3. 
74. The opinion noted that a standard deviation of one minute would imply that the six 
minute time was three standard deviations from the mean of nine minutes, and that deviations 
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Oddly, Branion's estimate for the standard deviation of the bruis-
ing time, which the court disdainfully dismissed as "a number from 
the air,"75 may be more defensible. Perhaps pathologists, when they 
toss out a range of times, do think in terms of two or three standard 
deviations.76 I, for one, tend to doubt this, but Branion's choice of a 
standard deviation for the bruising time does not contradict the evi-
dence quite so :flagrantly. 
Giving the benefit of all doubts to Branion, suppose we take the 
driving time X to be normally distributed with mean 9 and standard 
deviation 1.9, and the bruising time to be similarly distributed with 
mean 22.5 and standard deviation 2.5. Where does this get us? Bra-
nion's answer was to use such quantities to sketch the resulting distri-
butions of X and Y, and to multiply the two tail-end probabilities 
because "the two time-sequences are independent of each other."77 
This the court characterized as "mindless multiplication"78 produced 
"by a method that is proper only if the probability of the 6-minute 
drive and the 15-minute bruise are independent events,"79 when "on 
the state's hypothesis of a planned murder, they are anything but 
independent."80 
Whether the times are dependent, however, is not so clear, and 
even if they are, the true villain may not be the claim of independence. 
The rules for combining probabilities also justify the multiplication of 
probabilities of dependent events. 81 To analyze the assumption of sta-
tistical independence and to show that this assumption is not essential 
to Branion's computation, we must clarify the meaning of indepen-
dence. Then we turn to a flaw in that calculation that cannot be ex-
plained away - the specification of the event whose probability we 
wish to calculate. 
Neither the court nor counsel explained what "independence" 
this large or larger should arise much less frequently than the one out of six times reported by the 
police if the distribution really were normal. Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1265 (7th Cir. 
1988). Of course, this point applies to the twelve minute time as well. Although Branion's 
figures implied that values as extreme as the two he reported would occur very rarely, they 
evidently had been observed twice in the sample of six. 
75. 855 F.2d at 1265. 
76. I have assumed that the pathologist is giving a range for a distribution of objectively 
known bruising times. Some statisticians would prefer to say that the pathologist is describing a 
subjective, or personal distribution that measures his degree of belief in each possible bruising 
time. They would ask whether he would agree that his distribution is approximately normal and 
has the standard deviation claimed by Branion. Even if there are no specific data on bruising 
times known to the pathologist, they might be willing to proceed on the basis of the expert's 
subjective judgment. 
77. 855 F.2d at 1270. 
78. 855 F.2d at 1264. 
79. 855 F.2d at 1265. 
80. 855 F.2d at 1265. 
81. Pp. 81, 87; cf. Fairley & Mosteller, A Conversation About Collins, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 
242 (1974) (implications for People v. Collins). 
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means here, and the concept is surprisingly subtle. 82 Statistical inde-
pendence does not mean causal independence. 83 It simply means that 
one event is neither more nor less likely to occur when another one 
does. If A is one event and B another, then A is independent of B if 
and only if the conditional probability of A given B equals the uncon-
ditional probability of A, that is, if Pr(AJ,B) = Pr(A) (p. 81). When A 
and B are independent in this sense, knowing that B has occurred 
should not affect our judgment of the probability that A will occur. 
Branion reasoned that "since the two time-sequences are independ-
ent of each other, the probabilities must be multiplied to find the 
chances that both were applicable to Dr. Branion."84 If the driving 
time X is independent of the bruising time Y, then it would indeed 
follow from the definition of conditional probability85 that the 
probability of both a small driving time and a small bruising time is 
the product of the probability of each of these small times: 
Pr[(X<xs)&(Y<ys)] = Pr(X<xs)Pr(Y<ys)· (5) 
Branion took the individual probabilities to be 0.01, yielding a joint 
probability of 0.0001. Because the probability associated with values 
as small as three standard deviations below the mean of a normal 
curve is 0.0013,86 however, the joint probability under Branion's view 
of the evidence is actually much less. It is (0.0013)2 = 0.0000017. On 
the other hand, we also have seen that Branion erred in inferring or 
positing a standard deviation of driving times of only one minute. 
82. See, e.g., Kruskal, Miracles and Statistics: The Casual Assumption of Independence, 83 J. 
AM. STATISrICAL A. 929 (1988); Meier & Zabell, Benjamin Pierce and The Howland Will, 75 J. 
AM. STATISrICAL A. 497, 501-02 (1980). Statistics far Lawyers contains no sustained analysis of 
these subtleties. 
83. Two events A and B may be dependent even when A does not influence B and vice versa. 
Thus, the number of gallons of ice cream consumed per year may rise along with the number of 
crimes committed by juveniles per year (because of a growing juvenile population). Although 
eating ice cream does not cause crime, and crime does not cause people to eat ice cream, the 
quantities of ice cream consumption and juvenile crime nevertheless would not be statistically 
independent. Cf G. YULE & M. KENDALL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF STATIS-
TICS 315-16 (14th ed. 1950) (nearly perfect correlation between number of radios and number of 
mental defectives per 10,000 people in United Kingdom from 1924 to 1937). 
84. Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d at 1270. 
85. The probability of A conditioned on B is the joint probability divided by the probability 
of B. In symbols, Pr(AIB) = Pr(A and B)/Pr(B). To say that A and Bare independent, how-
ever, means that Pr(AIB) = Pr(A). Substituting Pr(A) for Pr(AIB) yields Pr(A) = Pr(A and 
B)/Pr(B). Multiplying both sides of this last equation by Pr(B) gives the result that 
Pr(A)Pr(B) = Pr(A and B). In other words, when A and Bare independent, the probability of 
both A and B is the probability of A times the probability of B. In fact, it is common to take this 
multiplication rule as defining independence and to deduce that for independent events A and B, 
Pr(AIB) = Pr(A). Whichever route one takes, however, the special multiplication rule described 
here holds if and only if A and B are independent. 
86. Why the brief would advance the 0.01 figure is a mystery. That the true value is much 
smaller, and therefore more supportive of Branion's case, is apparent from the picture in Bra-
nion's brief. As depicted there, 99.73% of the area under the normal curve lies within plus-or-
minus three standard deviations. Hence, .27% lies in the two tails, and half of0.27%, or 0.135% 
= 0.00135, is in each tail. 
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Since the smallest standard deviation consistent with the data on driv-
ing times is 1.9 minutes, equation (5) leads to the conclusion that the 
probability that X < 6 and Y < 15 is (0.057)(0.0013) = 0.00007.87 
On the assumptions most favorable to Branion, then, the joint 
probability is even smaller than Branion and his counsel imagined. 
But are short driving times and short bruising times uncorrelated, 
as this analysis supposes? We want the times Y for people who know 
how long it took them to drive the route. If these people can and 
would inflict a bruise more quickly to compensate for a large X then Y 
is not independent of X If they might be more leisurely in the stran-
gling when the drive went quickly, then, once again, Y is not in-
dependent of X On the other hand, if the "garroting time" depicted 
in the brief is predominantly the time it takes for a bruise to form from 
blood flowing from broken capillaries, then even a murderer intent on 
minimizing the "garroting time" may be unable to exert much control 
over Y. Because the trial testimony sheds little light on the reasons for 
the variability in Y, the court's criticism of the independence assump-
tion must be justified on the ground that a reviewing court should ex-
amine the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. 
Without a record or judicially noticeable facts indicating indepen-
dence, the appellate court may not wish to entertain so favorable an 
assumption for the proponent of the probability analysis. 
Still, joint probabilities exist for dependent variables, just as they 
do for independent ones. The only difference is that some knowledge 
of the relationship between the variables is required to find the 
probability that both are small. Rather than considering X and Y sep-
arately, we can consider the probability of each possible pair of values 
X and Y. This way of thinking leads to a joint probability distribution 
p(X Y) from which the probability that X and Y are within a given 
region is easily obtained. 88 Of course, we have already seen that using 
the limited evidence in Branion to specify the unconditional distribu-
tions f{X) and g(Y) of the driving and bruising times is difficult 
enough. Using it to obtain a joint distribution that assigns probabili-
87. These numbers are the area in the left-hand tails of the pertinent normal curves. See 
supra Figure 1. The valueX = 6 is (9 - 6)/1.9 = 1.58 standard deviations below the mean of9 
for X. The probability of a value at least this far below the mean for a normal random variable is 
0.057. Likewise, the value Y = IS is (22.5 - 15)/2.5 = 3 standard deviations to the left of the 
mean for Y. The probability for a Y this small or smaller for a normal random variable is about 
.0013. 
88. The joint probability of X not exceeding x, and Y not exceedingy, is the volume under the 
joint distribution and above the rectangle whose comers are (0,0), (x,,O), (O,y,) and (x,,y,): 
< < Jx, JY• Pr(X=x., Y=y.) = d-r p(X=-r,Y= <!>)d<!>. 
0 0 
This definition is not presented in Statistics for Lawyers, but the text does speak of "two variables 
with a joint distribution" (p. 51). 
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ties to all the possible combinations of these times seems out of the 
question. 
There is, however, a way to deduce the probability of a joint event 
that does not demand the full joint distribution, but only certain slices 
through it. Rather than worrying about all possible combinations of X 
and Y, one can consider the distribution of possible bruising times Y 
given specific values for the driving time X. In estimating the range of 
bruising times, the pathologist may well have known that the state's 
theory involved a very brief driving time. Arguably, his estimate for Y 
was conditioned on the assumption of a small value Xs of X. If so, he 
was describing not the unconditional distribution g(Y), but a condi-
tional distribution g(YJX = Xs)· 89 If we indulge the further assump-
tion that this conditional distribution is approximately the same for all 
small driving times and if we interpret the pathologist's meager re-
marks as positing a normal distribution with a well-specified mean and 
standard deviation, then the probability of particular values of X and 
Y is a product akin to one that Branion proposed. Analogous to equa-
tion (5), we might write: 
Pr[(X<xs) and (Y<ys)] = Pr(X<xs) Pr[(Y<ys)l(X<xs)] (6) 
In other words, the joint probability that the driving time will not ex-
ceed Xs :riiinutes and that the bruising time will not exceed Ys minutes is 
(a) the probability that the driving time will not exceed Xs multiplied 
by (b) the probability that the bruising time will not exceed y., given 
that the driving time does not exceed x.. · 
This reinterpretation of the pathologist's testimony sidesteps the 
court's complaint that the events are "anything but independent."90 It 
acknowledges their dep~ndence and purports to account for it by using 
the multiplication rule that applies to dependent events. In this way, it 
seems to justify the conclusion that the evidence about driving and 
bruising times indicates a probability for X < 6 and Y < 15 of 
0.00007. But even if the problem of independence can be surmounted 
in this fashion, an additional objection to Branion's analysis remains. 
The court recognized that more was at work than the dubious in-
dependence assumption, for it stated: 
That's still not all. Even if the time sequences are independent, even 
if we are interested in the probability that the driving plus choking time 
is 21 minutes or less, even if the distributions are Gaussian, the 
89. Cf. p. 51 (referring to "the conditional distribution of Y given fixed values of X = x"). 
This interpretation of the pathologist's testimony came to mind as a result of remarks by Profes-
sor D'Amato. Letter from Anthony D'Amato to David Kaye (Sept. 22, 1989) ("any probabilis-
tic inference you make concerning the killer's time-dependence at the lowest end of the spectrum 
is wholly offset by the fact that loading the spectrums at the minimum time is already built into 
the state's case because the state has the burden of proof"). Professor D'Amato does not sub-
scribe to my formulation, which he complains "[does not do] justice to my arguments contained 
in our correspondence." D'Amato letter, supra note 45. 
90. Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1265 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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probability is very sensitive to the assumed standard deviation. On Bra-
nion's assumptions, the probability is 0.1 % rather than 0.01 % as Bra-
nion believes; on more plausible assumptions, the probability is 10%.91 
An accompanying footnote explains that "[w]e need to compute, from 
the means and variances of two or more independent events, the joint 
mean and variance."92 Resorting to a general formula for the variance 
of any differentiable function of N independent variables, and using 
two distinct pairs of values for the standard deviations of the driving 
and bruising times, the court arrives at the probabilities of 0.001 and 
O.lQ.93 
The court's discussion, although basically correct, is marred by 
computational errors and is needlessly opaque. It can be clarified, not 
by any particular formula in Statistics for Lawyers, but by a careful 
articulation of the problem. Recall that we introduced the separate 
distributions X and Y for the driving and bruising times only because 
the total time Z could be expressed as their sum. The event of interest 
is whether or not Z is less than or equal to the minimum time that 
Branion would have needed to commit the murder. Branion's brief, 
however, computed the probability that the driving time X would not 
exceed six minutes and that the bruising time Y would not exceed fif-
teen minutes. The court stated that a different procedure must be used 
to find the probability that Z < 21, but it never explained why. Ap-
parently, the authors of the Branion brief believed that this range of 
outcomes for X and Y coincided with the event that the sum of these 
times would not exceed twenty-one minutes. SinceX < 6 and Y < 15 
imply that X + Y < 21, this implicit assumption may seem justified, 
and the court's opinion, which was otherwise quite detailed, did not 
explicitly question it. However, the premise is fallacious. A multipli-
cation procedure like that in equation (6) is inappropriate for the sim-
ple reason thatX + Y < 21 does not imply thatX < 6 and Y < 15. 
There are many ways to make the driving and bruising times add to no 
more than twenty-one minutes while having the driving time exceed 
six minutes or the bruising time exceed fifteen minutes.94 Because the 
probability given by equation (6) neglects such possibilities, Branion's 
procedure of multiplying the two tail-end probabilities necessarily un-
derstates the probability of the event that is of interest - that Z < 21. 
To find the probability of this event, we do not need to evaluate the 
partial derivatives of Z with respect to X and Y, as the court did. The 
necessary formula can be derived with only high school algebra.95 The 
91. ~55 F.2d at 1265. 
92. 855 F.2d at 1265 n.7. 
93. 855 F.2d at 1266 n.7. 
94. For example, let X = 7 and Y = 14. Then X + Y ~ 21 even though X > 6. 
95. M. DEGROOT, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 159 (1975) (Theorem 4). This result is a 
special case of the more general formula given in the court's opinion. 
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result, as reported in Statistics for Lawyers, is that "[t]he variance 
[which is the square of the standard deviation] of the sum of two in-
dependent random variables is the sum of the separate variance" (p. 
43): 
Var(X + Y) = Var(X) + Var(Y). (7) 
Using Branion's values of 1 and 2.5 for the standard deviations of X 
and Y, one concludes that the variance of Z is 7 .25, corresponding to a 
standard deviation for Z of o{Z) = 2.69.96 Because the sum of two 
normal distributions is also normal, and its mean is just the sum of the 
means of each distribution,97 the event of interest has a probability 
given by the area beneath the appropriate normal curve and to the left 
of Z = 21 minutes.98 Thus, the probability of a sufficiently small 
time, using Branion's impossible values for the parameters of the driv-
ing and bruising times, is below 0.0001.99 
There is irony in these numbers. The court's effort to improve on 
Branion's calculation, although correct in principle, inexplicably over-
states the joint probability by a factor of twenty. 100 At the same time, 
Branion's conceptual and arithmetic errors fortuitously cancel. The 
joint probability under a model that assumes independence of two nor-
mal random variables is about 0.1 %, as Branion found by applying the 
wrong formula to the wrong numbers, and not 0.01 % as the court 
found by misapplying the right formula. With the more plausible use 
of the smallest possible standard deviation of the driving time, 101 the 
probability is about 0.0004, 102 which is an order of magnitude larger 
than the 0.00007 figure obtained from Branion's procedure of multi-
plying two tail-end probabilities. 
In short, the court's final criticism of Branion's "mindless multipli-
cation" - that it fails to combine properly the two random variables 
- is apt.103 That procedure is wrong because it misstates the event 
whose probability is of interest, and thereby ignores outcomes that 
contribute to the probability that the total time is small. On the other 
hand, however egregious the error may be at the conceptual level, in 
96. We have Var(Z) = Var(X) + Var(Y) = 12 + 2.52 = 1 + 6.25 = 7.25, and a(Z) = 
v7.25 = 2.69. The court found the standard deviation of Z to be 2.73. 855 F.2d at 1266 n.7. 
97. E.g., M. DEGROOT, supra note 95, at 151 (Theorem 3). 
98. This curve has mean M(Z) = M(X) + M(l') = 9 + 22.5 = 31.5 minutes and standard 
deviation 2.69 minutes. 
99. Z = 21 is 10.5/2.69 = 3.9 standard deviations below the mean. The area in the corre-
sponding left-hand tail of a standard normal curve is 0.000048. 
100. The court's figureof0.1% divided by Pr(Z ~ 21) when M(Z)=31.5 and a(Z)=2.69 is 
0.00100/0.000048 = 20.8 times too large. 
101. See supra note 73. 
102. Again, we have a normal distribution with mean 31.5 minutes. The variance of .Z 
however, is now 1.92 + 2.52 = 9.85. The corresponding standard deviation is a(Z) = 3.14. The 
area to the left of a point 10.5/3.14 = 3.35 standard deviations below the mean is about 0.0004. 
103. Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1264 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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this instance it has little practical import. A probability of one out of 
ten thousand or even four out of ten thousand is still awfully small. 
So the question remains: How could a jury applying the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard rationally conclude that so improbable an 
outcome had occurred? One possibility is that the other evidence of 
guilt was extremely powerful, so that it would be reasonable to con-
clude that the improbable occurred.104 To enhance the plausibility of 
this result, the court's opinion portrays the circumstantial evidence in 
a dramatic light. 105 
In addition, the opinion shows that if the standard deviations of X 
and Y were much larger than Branion's estimates, the probability 
would rise to 0.1.106 In this range, the probability is more easily out-
weighed by the state's evidence of guilt. In view of the terrible uncer-
tainty in the estimates of the parameters on which the probability 
depends, this kind of sensitivity analysis is admirable. If the plausible 
variations in the parameter estimates had an insubstantial effect on the 
relevant probability, then some of the court's complaints would not 
have seriously undercut Branion's claim. Because the probability 
floated by Branion turns out to be sensitive to plausible changes in the 
values of the parameters, the 0.0001 figure cannot be decisive. 
B. Putting Probability in Its Place 
En route to its withering critique of Branion's computations, the 
court of appeals praised the "substantial value" of "[s]tatistical meth-
ods, properly employed."107 Because the court was confronted only 
with a probability argument in an appeal on the sufficiency of the evi-
dence, it did not consider the potential value of trial testimony or ar-
gument about probabilities. Indeed, there was no such testimony in 
Branion. Nonetheless, the court of appeals took the opportunity to 
104. A less obvious possibility is that the probability that anyone in Branion's position could 
commit the crime in the available time really is very small - but the probability of each altema· 
tive explanation is smaller still. In this situation, even an "outrageous" possibility can emerge 
victorious. Meier & Zabell, supra note 82, at S02. 
lOS. The court notes (1) the presence of a mistress whom Branion married shortly after the 
murder, (2) a Walther PPK and four shells of ammunition for it missing from Branion's gun 
collection, where ballistics experts determined that the murder weapon was a Walther PPK, and 
four shell casings were found near the body, and (3) some peculiar explanations that Branion 
offered the police. SSS F.2d at 1258. For the view that the opinion disingenuously overstates the 
significance of these items, see D'Amato, Self-Regulation of Judicial Misconduct Could Be Mis· 
Regulation, 89 MICH. L. REv. 609, 620-21 (1990); D'Amato, supra note 38. 
106. The court wrote that "[i]f ... the standard deviation of the driving times = 3 and the 
standard deviation of bruise-forming times is 7.S minutes, •.. we quickly compute [o(Z)] = 8.1 
minutes, so that the probability that [Z] ~ 21 :::::: 0.10." 85S F.2d at 1266 n.7. This computation 
is correct: a2(Z) = 32 + 7.52 = 65.2S, and o(Z) = 8.08; Z = 21 therefore is (21 - 31.5)/8.08 
= 1.3 standard deviations from the mean, with corresponding probability Pr(Z~21) = 0.097. 
The court opines that these values for the standard deviations are "more plausible." 855 F.2d at 
126S. The value o(X) = 3, however, is near the maximum possible sample standard deviation. 
See supra note 73. 
107. 855 F.2d at 1263-64. 
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comment on probability analysis at trials, and it equated "statistical 
inferences" with more traditional evidence.108 Thus, the court opined, 
the lesson of previous cases of probability evidence "is not that statisti-
cal methods are suspect, but that people must be sure of what they are 
looking for, and how they can prove it before they start fooling with 
algebra." 109 
Statistics for Lawyers is not wrong to cite Branion for these general 
propositions, but there is more to be learned from the case than this. 
In the sense described by Hume and other philosophers, all evidence 
is, at bottom, probabilistic, but probability theory may be applied to 
courtroom proof in at least two distinct ways. It may function as evi-
dence in itself, or it may serve as a cognitive aid, helping the trier of 
fact to weigh other evidence. These distinct functions have different 
implications for the usefulness of probability theory, although both ap-
plications of the theory are potentially legitimate and desirable. 
The use of probability as evidence occurs when some objective 
quantity, such as life expectancy, no the probability of recovering from 
a disease, m or the chance of a black serving on a grand jury, 112 is 
probative of some material issue. In these cases, a well-defined chance 
model is both available for and essential to evaluating this quantity, 
and the meaning of the quantity is not especially controversial. As 
such, statistical methods directed at these quantities should not be es-
pecially suspect. As the Branion court announced, the only real con-
cern in the probability-as-evidence cases is the soundness of the 
methodology. 
The probabilistic reasoning in Branion is different. Counsel relied 
on probability theory not as an item of evidence in itself, but as a rhe-
torical device to suggest the impact that other evidence should have. 
The argument was that because the probability of the times falling 
within the window of opportunity open to John Branion was 1/10,000, 
no rational jury could have found him guilty. Such reliance on 
probability theory to tell jurors and judges what to believe about evi-
dence has provoked acrimonious controversy, in part because it is 
more difficult to agree upon an underlying probability model for the 
evidence and also because not all probabilists agree that probability 
108. 855 F.2d at 1264. The court stated: 
Much of the evidence we think of as most reliable is just a compendium of statistical infer-
ences. . • . Nothing about the nature of litigation in general, or the criminal process in 
particular, makes anathema of additional information, whether or not that knowledge has 
numbers attached. After all, even eyewitnesses are testifying only to probabilities .... 
See also DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203, 207 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting) 
("[M]ost knowledge, and almost all legal evidence, is probabilistic."). 
109. 855 F.2d at 1264. 
110. See DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
111. E.g., Annotation, Medical Ma/practice: Measure and Elements of Damages in Actions 
Based on Loss of Chance, 81 A.L.R. 4th 485 (1990). 
112. E.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986). 
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theory can model belief.113 While I do not believe that these consider-
ations should preclude the use of probability theory as a cognitive 
aid, 114 one can maintain that even well-crafted probability arguments 
about the significance of evidence should be suspect - not to the ex-
tent of dismissing them out of hand, but to ensure that these argu-
ments are taken as a guide to thought and not a substitute for it. 
Furthermore, in considering probability theory as a cognitive aid 
in the assessment of evidence, one must attend to another possible dis-
tinction not apparent in Branion's undifferentiated discussion of 
probability evidence. In some instances, such as proof based on blood 
antigens in rape and paternity litigation, the factfinder cannot possibly 
understand the probative value of the evidence without some statisti-
cal analysis. 115 Therefore, almost all courts allow relevant quantita-
tive descriptions in this situation.116 But it seems hasty to cite such 
cases, as the Branion court does,117 for the acceptability of explicit 
statistical analysis in instances where the trier of fact can appreciate 
the evidence without any quantitative testimony.118 
Although case law provides little guidance, even here probability 
demonstrations should not be categorically excluded. The nature of 
the evidence may not compel the introduction of probability theory, 
and such demonstrations can never be binding, but they can be in-
structive: "The outcome of a competent model can be compared with 
intuition. If the two agree, that is a source of confidence; if they don't 
- that is a point of departure for critical appraisal."119 
To be sure, in most cases even this weak use of probability theory 
may not be justified, especially when the evidence it affects is tangen-
tial rather than central and when the presentation threatens to obscure 
more than it can clarify. These are matters for the trial court to bal-
ance and juggle.120 The general endorsement in Branion and Statistics 
113. See, e.g., PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: THE USES AND 
LIMITS OF BAYESIANISM (P. Tillers & E. Green eds. 1988). 
114. Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 34 (1979). 
115. Ellman & Kaye, Probabilities and Proof: Can HLA and Blood Group Testing Prove 
Paternity?, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1131 (1979); see generally Kaye, supra note 114. 
116. See authorities cited supra note 34. 
117. Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1264 (7th Cir. 1988). 
118. In Branion. the jury could understand the testimony about the driving and bruising 
times and appreciate, at least roughly, its implications without a mathematical analysis. This is 
not to deny that a suitable formal analysis could not aid the trier of fact, but it does mean that a 
probabilistic or decision theoretic analysis is not essential. 
119. Bar-Hillel, Probabilistic Analysis in Legal Factfinding, 56 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 267, 
282 (1984). As in Branion. "[j]udges could also check the sensitivity or robustness of the models, 
Such an analysis might show .•• that within a broad range it does not really matter precisely 
what the [value of a particular variable] really is." Id. at 283. Bar-Hillel advocates this "soft" 
role for decision theoretic modeling of the inferences from all the evidence in a case, which is a 
formidable task, id., and one neither presented nor discussed in Branion. 
120. A body of pertinent empirical research that promises to be of some assistance in this 
process is emerging. See Kaye & Koehler, Can Jurors Understand Probabilistic Evidence?, 154 J, 
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for Lawyers of "properly employed" statistical proof may incline some 
courts to be more open to probability calculations, but these remarks 
are dicta that dictate no concrete outcomes at the trial level. 
I have treated Branion v. Gramly in detail not merely because it is 
an "interesting" opinion likely to find its way into the casebooks, but 
because it vividly depicts the danger of a little knowledge. The at-
tempt to use probability theory in Branion was heroic. Like many acts 
of heroism, it also was hasty. Although there were some measure-
ments and estimates of quantities bearing on guilt or innocence, the 
empirical data were so sketchy that the computations inevitably were 
more creative than convincing. Furthermore, counsel committed a 
few unforced errors. To this extent, the case brings to mind the apho-
rism that "[w]hen a lawyer acts as his own statistician, the perform-
ance is about what you would expect from a statistician who acts as 
his own lawyer."121 
Courts as well as attorneys would do well to heed this admonition 
"before they start fooling with algebra."122 Despite a lapse or two in 
its own calculations, the Branion court successfully flagged the major 
problems in the sort of discourse that Auguste Compte once deni-
grated as "ponderous algebraic verbiage,"123 but, in some respects, the 
algebra was more plausible than the court allowed, and in others, less 
so.124 As Finkelstein and Levin indicate, other courts, also acting as 
their own statisticians, have fared less well. 125 Thus, a national panel 
ROYAL STATISTICAL A. 75 (1991); Thompson, Are Jurors Competent to Evaluate Statistical Evi-
dence?, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 9. 
121. Carter, Flora, Van Bowen & Myers, Statistics and the Virginia Blood Test Statute, 56 
VA. L. REV. 349, 357 (1970) (quoting Deming, On the Contributions of Standards of Sampling to 
Legal Evidence and Accounting, 19 CuRRENT Bus. STUD. 14, 15 (1954)). 
122. Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1264 (7th Cir. 1988). Moreover, most legal applica-
tions call for the skills of an applied statistician whose training extends beyond the mathematical 
theory of probability and statistics and encompasses some experience in working with data. 
123. 4 A. COMPTE, CoURS DE PHILOSOPHIE POSITIVE 366-68 (3d ed. 1809), reprinted in 
PHYSIQUE SocIALE: CoURS DE PHILOSOPHIE PosmvE, LEc;ONS 46 A 60, at 168-69 (Jean-Paul 
Enthoven ed. 1975). 
124. Furthermore, one wonders whether the judges subscribing to the opinion in Branion 
could have joined some parts of that opinion on anything other than faith in its author or perhaps 
their law clerks. Justice Stevens was sensitive to this problem when he candidly stated in his 
dissenting opinion in Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 318 n.5 (1977) 
(dissenting opinion), that "one of my law clerks advised me that ... there is only about a 5% 
likelihood that a disparity this large would be produced by random selection from the labor 
pool." When passing on more traditional case or policy analysis, judges can verify the quality of 
the work for themselves. With most mathematical analyses, many judges would have to hedge 
their opinions with revealing qualifications like Justice Stevens' conditional conclusion, "[i]f [my 
clerk's] calculation is correct .... " 433 U.S. 299, 318 n.5. 
125. See supra note 25. For further illustrations, see, e.g., Fairley & Sugrue, A Case of Unex-
amined Assumptions: The Use and Misuse of the Statistical Analysis of Castaneda/Hazelwood in 
Discrimination Litigation, 24 B.C. L. REV. 925 (1983); Kaye, supra note 20; Kaye, Statistical 
Evidence of Discrimination in Jury Selection, in STATISTICAL METHODS IN DISCRIMINATION 
LmGATION, supra note 7, at 13. In Rowan v. Owens, 752 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1984), Judge 
Posner multiplied a few probabilities in Collins-like style to help demonstrate that evidence was 
sufficient to support a conviction. He argued only that his admittedly "arbitrary" numbers 
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recently warned of "possible dangers" when, as in Branion, "the judge 
is familiar with a statistical method the parties have not applied to 
data in evidence," and he does "his own ad hoc analysis."126 
Probability theory remains an arcane and dangerous tool for law-
yers and courts. As Statistics for Lawyers argues, however, it is also a 
powerful and valuable instrument. The challenge for the legal system 
is to develop the knowledge and rules that will tend to produce techni-
cally sound and conceptually appropriate mathematical demonstra-
tions, at trial or on appeal. 
Statistics for Lawyers invests its resources, wisely, in the infrastruc-
ture of building knowledge rather than the analyses of doctrine and 
the construction of rules. The law student, attorney, or judge who 
appreciates the content of this textbook will be in a position to avoid 
or counter the kinds of errors made in Branion and to make more 
effective use of a broad spectrum of statistical thinking and resources. 
As Finkelstein and Levin explain, "[a] knowledgeable lawyer may not 
dispatch questions of legal policy with statistics, but by knowing more 
of the subject may hope to contribute to the store of rational and civi-
lized discourse by which insights are gained and new accommodations 
reached. That ... is the larger purpose of this book" (p. ix). It is a 
worthy purpose for a worthwhile book. 
merely "bring out the point that it is wrong to view items of evidence in isolation when they point 
in the same direction." 752 F.2d at 1188. To this extent, his sua sponte use of probability theory 
is not troublesome. 
126. STATISTICAL AssESSMENTS, supra note 23, at 176. The panel recommended that 
in general, judges should not conduct analytical statistical studies on their own. If a court is 
not satisfied with the statistical evidence before it, alternative means should be used to clar-
ify matters, such as a request for additional submissions from the parties or even, in excep-
tional circumstances, a reopening of the case to received additional evidence. 
STATISTICAL AssESSMENTS, supra note 23, at 176. Heeding this advice might have spared the 
Branion court the embarrassment of the arithmetical errors noted above, but would not have 
affected the outcome on appeal. 
